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Construction Law
David Cook*
Peter Crofton**
I. INTRODUCTION
The year 2020 brought about interesting judicial opinions in
construction law addressing licensing issues, contractual, and
common-law indemnity, including the anti-indemnity statute,
homeowner’s association rights, and the recovery of lost profits on
incomplete work. It also addressed standard construction-law issues in
unique contexts, such as construction liens and insurance coverage and
exclusions. Though the year faced the COVID-19 pandemic, decisions
addressing the unprecedented circumstances caused by the virus will
likely come in future years. This Article surveys significant judicial,
regulatory, and legislative developments in Georgia construction law
during the period from June 1, 2020, through May 31, 2021.1
II. LICENSING
An often-overlooked aspect of construction law is compliance with
contractor licensing. The Georgia Court of Appeals reaffirmed Georgia
law concerning the invalidity of a contract with an unlicensed general
contractor in Saks Management & Associates, LLC v. Sung General
Contracting, Inc.2 In Saks, an unlicensed contractor undertook the
renovation of an apartment complex.3 A series of unfortunate events

*Partner, Autry, Hall, & Cook LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. Mercer University (B.B.A., 2001);
Georgia College & State University (M.S., 2002); Mercer University School of Law (J.D.,
2005). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
**Partner, Smith, Gambrell & Russell, LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. Auburn University (Bach. of
Computer Engineering 1986); Emory University School of Law (J.D., 1990). Member, State
Bars of Georgia, Alabama, Florida, and Tennessee.
1. For an analysis of last year’s construction law during the Survey period, see Ward
Stone Jr., Construction Law, Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 72 MERCER L. REV. 59 (2020).
2. 356 Ga. App. 568, 849 S.E.2d 19 (2020).
3. Id., 849 S.E.2d at 23.

59

60

MERCER LAW REVIEW

Vol. 73

befell the contractor, and the project owner terminated the contractor
and sued for damages. The contractor counterclaimed for breach of
contract, quantum meruit, and unjust enrichment.4
The owner moved for summary judgment on all of the contractor’s
counterclaims.5 The Gwinnett County Superior Court denied the motion,
and the owner appealed. The court of appeals reversed the trial court,
determining that summary judgment should have been granted.6 It
looked to Georgia’s licensing law, codified at section 43-41-17 of the
Official Code of Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A.),7 to determine whether an
unlicensed contractor can enforce its contract, stating,
[a]s a matter of public policy, any contract . . . for the performance of
work for which a residential contractor or general contractor license is
required by this chapter . . . and which is between an owner and a
contractor who does not have a valid and current license required for
such work in accordance with this chapter shall be unenforceable in
law or in equity by the unlicensed contractor.8

Thus, the contractor’s breach of contract and its equitable claims could
not survive.
There is, however, a limit on the applicability of O.C.G.A. § 43-41-17.
In a case decided less than a year after Saks, the Georgia Court of
Appeals refused to apply O.C.G.A. § 43-41-17 to a contract involving an
arbitration clause.9 In Jhun v. Imagine Castle, LLC, it explained that
Georgia’s public policy on the enforcement of arbitration clauses requires
that the arbitration clause in an otherwise seemingly void contract be
enforced so as to allow arbitrators to decide whether the underlying
contract is void.10 The court also cited to the Supreme Court of the United
States’ decision in Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardenga,11 as
requiring that arbitrators, rather than courts, decide issues of contract
voidness unless there is a specific challenge to the enforceability of the
arbitration clause itself.12
The court of appeals also addressed the liability of a natural person
who holds a contractor’s license and qualifies a business entity for
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Id. at 570, 849 S.E.2d at 24.
Id.
Id. at 574, 849 S.E.2d at 27.
O.C.G.A. § 43-41-17 (2021).
Saks, 356 Ga. App. at 570–71, 849 S.E.2d at 24.
Jhun v. Imagine Castle, LLC, 358 Ga. App. 627, 856 S.E.2d 24 (2021).
Id. at 629–30, 856 S.E.2d at 27.
546 U.S. 440 (2006).
Jhun, 358 Ga. App. at 630, 856 S.E.2d at 27.
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licensure.13 In Laliwala v. Harris,14 a business owner hired a general
contractor to renovate a building.15 The general contractor was
unlicensed, so it hired a licensed contractor “to serve as the statutory
qualifying agent for the Project [and] allowed [the unlicensed general
contractor] to use his general contractor’s license to obtain permits for
the Project.” Problems developed, so the owner sued the general
contractor and its owner for breach of contract and various tort claims,
and also asserted various tort claims against the individual license
holder in his capacity as the qualifying agent for the project.16
The license holder moved for summary judgment based on O.C.G.A.
section 43-41-9(i),17 which provides that the license laws do not impose
“civil liability against an individual qualifying agent by any owner . . .
beyond the liability that would otherwise exist legally or contractually
apart from and independent of the individual’s status as a qualifying
agent.”18 The State Court of Cobb County granted summary judgment
and the court of appeals affirmed.19
The court of appeals’ decision is notable for two reasons. First, the
decision clearly states that the license law does not impose a duty of care
on license-qualifying agents to third parties.20 Second, the decision leaves
several unanswered questions such as what independent duties a
licensed
contractor—a
licensed
professional
under
O.C.G.A. section 9-11-9.121—owes to third parties, if any, and what are
the legal ramifications of the unlicensed general contractor hiring a
third-party company to allow use of its contractor’s license, a practice
often called “license renting” that is illegal in many jurisdictions.
In Fleetwood v. Lucas,22 the Georgia Court of Appeals addressed the
definition of “contractor” under the licensing statute, as well as the
exception for repair work.23 In this case, Fleetwood hired Lucas to
perform work on two houses.24 Lucas alleged that he completed the work,
but Fleetwood failed to pay the remaining balance owed.25 Following the
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id. at 629, 856 S.E.2d at 26–27.
357 Ga. App. 365, 850 S.E.2d 804 (2020).
Id. at 365, 850 S.E.2d at 806.
Id.
O.C.G.A. § 43-41-9(i) (2021).
Laliwala, 357 Ga. App. at 368, 850 S.E.2d at 807 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 43-41-9(i)).
Id. at 368–69, 850 S.E.2d at 808.
Id. at 368, 850 S.E.2d at 807.
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1 (2021).
354 Ga. App. 320, 840 S.E.2d 720 (2020).
Id. at 324, 840 S.E.2d at 723.
Id. at 320, 840 S.E.2d at 721.
Id. at 322, 840 S.E.2d at 721–22.
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failure to pay, Lucas sued for breach of contract in the State Court of
Fulton County. Fleetwood moved for summary judgment on the grounds
that Lucas had no license to perform the work. The trial court denied
Fleetwood’s motion, and the case proceeded to a jury. After the jury
returned a verdict in favor of Lucas, Fleetwood appealed.26
Generally, if a person holds no residential or general contractor’s
license but performs work when a license is required, the contract is
unenforceable.27 However, under O.C.G.A. § 43-41-17(g), a person may
perform repair work without a license if the person discloses that he or
she does not have a license, and the work does not affect the structural
integrity of the project.28
In this case, Lucas held no license, and he testified at trial that he did
not inform Fleetwood that he held no license.29 Because Lucas failed to
disclose that he held no license, the contract did not qualify for the repair
exception under O.C.G.A. § 43-41-17(g), rendering it unenforceable
under O.C.G.A. § 43-41-17(a).30
Nevertheless, Lucas argued he was not a “contractor” within the
meaning of the licensing statute because he bore no responsibility for any
contractual risk to the Fleetwoods.31 The definition of “contractor”
includes “construction management services” when the person
performing the “services is at risk contractually to the owner for the
performance and cost of the construction.”32 Based on this segment of the
definition, Lucas argued he was not a “contractor.”33 The court declined
to accept Lucas’s definition, and instead, the court liberally construed the
term to further the legislative intent of protecting property owners
against faulty construction.34
Finally, Lucas argued he was a mere servant of Fleetwood.35 But the
evidence showed he contracted with Fleetwood to perform construction
services, including repairs, in exchange for compensation. As a result, he
met the statutory definition of “contractor” under O.C.G.A. § 43-41-2(4).36

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id. at 323, 840 S.E.2d at 722.
O.C.G.A. § 43-41-17(b) (2021).
O.C.G.A. § 43-41-17(g) (2021).
Fleetwood, 354 Ga. App. at 322, 840 S.E.2d at 722.
Id. at 324, 840 S.E.2d at 723.
Id.
Id. at 325, 840 S.E.2d at 723 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 43-41-2(4)(a) (2021).
Id. at 324, 840 S.E.2d at 723.
Id. at 325, 840 S.E.2d at 723.
Id., 840 S.E.2d at 724.
Id.

2021

CONSTRUCTION LAW

63

III. ANTI-INDEMNITY STATUTE
Georgia’s anti-indemnity statute37 directly applies to construction
contracts and, as of July 1, 2016, contracts for engineering, architectural,
and land-surveying services.38 On remand from the Georgia Supreme
Court, the Georgia Court of Appeals addressed the prior version of
Georgia’s anti-indemnity statute.39 With a long history, the 2020 case of
Milliken & Co. v. Georgia Power Co.,40 originated with a plane crash that
injured and killed several passengers and crew members.41 Their
representatives sued several defendants, including a nearby plant owner,
Milliken & Company (Milliken), based on claims that the location of
transmission lines on Milliken’s property was the contributing cause of
the crash.42 Milliken asserted a cross claim against Georgia Power
Company (GPC) based on an easement it granted to GPC. The easement
required GPC to indemnify Milliken for any claims arising out of GPC’s
construction or maintenance of the transmission lines. The easement
provision at issue read as follows: “[GPC], its successors or assigns shall
hold [Milliken], its successors or assigns harmless from any damages to
property or persons (including death), or both, which result from [GPC’s]
construction, operation or maintenance of its facilities on said easement
areas herein granted.”43
On a motion for summary judgment, GPC argued that the provision
did not impose an indemnity obligation on GPC or, even if it did, the
provision violated the anti-indemnity statute.44 The Fulton State Court
found that the provision was a covenant not to sue, rather than an
indemnity obligation.45 The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s
ruling but did so based solely on GPC’s second argument—the provision
violated the anti-indemnity statute.46

37. O.C.G.A. §§ 13-8-2(b)-(c) (2021).
38. The statute was amended in 2016 to include certain indemnity provisions in
agreements for engineering, architectural, or land surveying services. Ga. H.R. Bill 943,
Reg. Sess. (2016).
39. The court construed the version of the anti-indemnity in effect in 1989, which is
when the easement was made. Milliken & Co. v. Georgia Power Co., 344 Ga. App. 560, 811
S.E.2d 58 (hereinafter Milliken I), rev’d, 306 Ga. 6, 829 S.E.2d 111 (2019) (hereinafter
Milliken II).
40. 354 Ga. App. 98, 839 S.E.2d 306 (2020) (hereinafter Milliken III).
41. Id. at 98, 839 S.E.2d at 308.
42. Milliken I, 344 Ga. App. at 561, 811 S.E.2d at 60.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 561-62, 811 S.E.2d at 60.
45. Milliken II, 306 Ga. at 7, 829 S.E.2d at 112.
46. Id., 829 S.E.2d at 113 (relying on the “right for any reason” rule).

64

MERCER LAW REVIEW

Vol. 73

On appeal to the supreme court, Milliken attacked the court of appeals’
interpretation of the anti-indemnity statute.47 In general, “a party may
contract away liability to the other party for the consequences of his own
negligence without contravening public policy, except when such
agreement is prohibited by statute.”48 As one such statute, the antiindemnity statute applies when an indemnification provision (i) “relates
in some way to a contract for ‘construction, alteration, repair, or
maintenance’ of certain property” and (ii) “promises to indemnify a party
for damages arising from that own party’s sole negligence.”49 Since the
easement required GPC to “construct, erect, install, operate, maintain,
inspect, reconstruct, repair, rebuild, renew and replace” transmission
poles and lines on Milliken’s property, the supreme court ruled that it
was within the scope of provisions governed by the anti-indemnity
provision.50
As to whether it violated the sole-negligence prong, the Georgia
Supreme Court ruled that it did not.51 In contrast to the statutory
prohibition, the easement did not require GPC to indemnify Milliken for
damages resulting from Milliken’s sole negligence. Instead, it required
GPC to indemnify Milliken for GPC’s negligence—which is not prohibited
by the statute.52
GPC cited cases that invalidated indemnity provisions that required
indemnification without regard to fault and were thus broad enough to
include the indemnitee’s negligence.53 Relying on these cases, GPC cited
Milliken’s pleadings, which sought indemnification from GPC ostensibly
without regard to fault.54 The supreme court rejected this argument
because, even though Milliken’s pleadings sought such broad
indemnification, the underlying indemnity provision did not.55
But the case did not end there. Since the court of appeals did not
address the trial court’s primary reasoning—that the clause was merely
a covenant not to use, rather than an indemnity clause—the supreme
court remanded the case.56 On remand in Milliken II, the court of appeals

47. Id. at 8, 829 S.E.2d at 113.
48. Id. (quoting Lanier at McEver v. Planners & Eng’rs Collaborative, 284 Ga. 204,
205, 663 S.E.2d 240, 242 (2008)).
49. Id. at 9, 829 S.E.2d at 113.
50. Id. at 9-10, 829 S.E.2d at 114.
51. Id. at 10, 829 S.E.2d at 114.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 11, 829 S.E.2d at 115.
54. Id. at 12, 829 S.E.2d at 115.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 14, 829 S.E.2d at 117.
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reversed the trial court’s ruling and construed the clause as an indemnity
clause.57 A provision need not contain the “magic word ‘indemnify.’”58
Moreover, the easement provisions reference to personal injuries and
death would be mere surplusage outside of an indemnity provision
because GPC would have no standing to assert a claim for wrongful
death.59 Accordingly, GPC’s motion for summary judgment should have
been denied because (i) the clause was one for indemnity and (ii) it did
not violate Georgia’s anti-indemnity statute.60
IV. CONTRACTS CLAUSES
The case of Havenbrook Homes, LLC v. Infinity Real Estate
Investment, Inc.61 raised several issues common to construction projects
and contracts.62 A deck collapsed causing serious injuries to a renter, Ms.
Williams, and her guest, both of whom sued several parties for their
injuries. Before Williams began renting the property, the property owner,
RHA1, hired Havenbrook Construction, LLC, which hired Infinity Real
Estate Investments (Infinity) to perform construction work on the deck,
and Infinity subcontracted the work to TMC Services, LLC (TMC). While
the parties disputed whether TMC was instructed to install bolts to
secure the deck, there was no dispute that the necessary bolts were never
added. When Williams entertained guests on the deck, it separated from
the building.63
Ms. Williams sued RHA1; its property manager Havenbrook Homes,
LLC; Havenbrook Construction; Infinity; and TMC.64 In response to the
Williams’ complaint, RHA1 and Havenbrook Homes asserted a
counterclaim against Williams for breach of the rental agreement. In
addition, Havenbrook Construction filed a crossclaim against Infinity.
And RHA1 and Havenbrook Homes filed a third-party complaint against
Infinity.65

57. Milliken III, 354 Ga. App. at 102, 839 S.E.2d at 310.
58. Id. at 101, 839 S.E.2d at 309.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 102, 839 S.E.2d at 310.
61. 356 Ga. App. 477, 847 S.E.2d 840 (2020).
62. Id. at 477, 847 S.E.2d at 842.
63. Id. at 478-79, 847 S.E.2d at 843.
64. Id. at 479, 847 S.E.2d at 843. Williams’ guest sued only Havenbrook Homes and
RHA1 for negligence.
65. Id., 847 S.E.2d at 844.
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A. Contractual Privity and Third-Party Beneficiary Status
With regard to RHA1’s breach-of-contract claim against Infinity, the
trial court granted summary judgment to Infinity because the relevant
contract was between Infinity and Havenbrook Construction, not
RHA1.66 The court of appeals affirmed, reasoning that RHA1’s status as
property owner that was the subject of the contract did not make RHA1
a party to the contract.67
Moreover, the court held that RHA1 was not a third-party beneficiary
of the relevant contract.68 In so ruling, the court declined to consider
parol evidence of the parties’ intentions and looked solely to the face of
the contract to find any intention that RHA1 was an intended
beneficiary.69 Though the Havenbrook entities argued that Infinity knew
the contract required work to benefit RHA1, the contract itself exhibited
no such intention.70
B. Common-Law Indemnity
With regard to Havenbrook Construction’s common-law indemnity
claim against Infinity, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s
dismissal.71 Common-law indemnity is available only in limited
circumstances, such as when liability is imputed based on another’s
tort.72 Reviewing the record, the court found that the allegations against
Havenbrook Construction were founded on its own negligence and not on
any theory of imputed or vicarious liability.73 It found, therefore, that
dismissal of the indemnity claim was proper.74
C. Contractual Indemnity Against Tenant
In their counterclaim against Williams for breach of the rental
agreement, RHA1 and Havenbrook Homes argued that Williams failed
to obtain liability insurance and failed to indemnify them. The court of
appeals affirmed the trial court’s award of summary judgment to
66. Id. at 480, 847 S.E.2d at 844.
67. Id. at 481, 847 S.E.2d at 845 (citing Jai Ganesh Lodging, Inc. v. David M. Smith,
Inc., 328 Ga. App. 713, 718-19, 760 S.E.2d 718, 723 (2014)).
68. Id. at 481-82, 847 S.E.2d 845 (quoting Perry Golf Course Dev., LLC v. Housing
Auth. of City of Atlanta, 294 Ga. App 387, 388, 670 S.E.2d 171 (2008)).
69. Id. at 482, 847 S.E.2d at 845-46.
70. Id., 847 S.E.2d at 846.
71. Id. at 483, 847 S.E.2d at 846.
72. Id. at 484, 847 S.E.2d at 847 (citing Hines v. Holland, 334 Ga. App. 292, 296, 779
S.E.2d 63, 67 (2015)).
73. Id. at 483, 847 S.E.2d at 846.
74. Id. at 484, 847 S.E.2d at 847.
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Williams, finding the indemnity provision violated Georgia’s antiindemnity statute in O.C.G.A. § 13-8-2(b).75
The defendants argued that the anti-indemnity statute was
inapplicable when “the issue [was] not their sole negligence in light of the
claims that Infinity was also negligent.”76 The court rejected that
argument, instead looking to the sweeping language of the indemnity
clause itself to find that it was overbroad.77 The clause required Williams
to indemnify them against all liability “without limitation” resulting from
“any damage or injury happening in or about” the property. Therefore,
the counterclaims for breach of the rental agreement were properly
dismissed.78
Finally, the court of appeals rejected the argument that the indemnity
clause was spared from the anti-indemnity statute because the rental
agreement required Williams to procure liability insurance.79 Even
though Williams was required to obtain liability insurance, under the
terms of the rental agreement, such insurance did not limit Williams’
liability.80 Thus, the indemnification provision remained in violation of
the anti-indemnity statute.81
V. CONSTRUCTION LIENS
In its 2020 Regular Session, the Georgia General Assembly passed
S.B. 315,82 which changed the form and effect of lien waivers and form
and deadline for affidavits of nonpayment. Since the Act has an effective
date of January 1, 2021, any opinions interpreting the changes will occur
in the future.83
In Massey v. Duke,84 the Georgia Supreme Court decided two
important issues relating to Georgia’s mechanics lien law. In Massey, a
homeowner hired a contractor to repair fire damage to a home.85 The
75. Id.
76. Id. at 485, 847 S.E.2d at 848.
77. Id. at 486, 847 S.E.2d at 848.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. (“The limits of said insurance shall not, however, limit the liability of [Williams]
hereunder.”).
81. Id.
82. Ga. S. Bill 315, Reg. Sess. (2020).
83. The Act is a response to the Georgia Court of Appeals opinion in ALA Constr.
Servs., LLC v. Controlled Access, Inc., 351 Ga. App. 841, 833 S.E.2d 570 (2019) (holding
lienor’s failure to file an affidavit of nonpayment not only waived its lien and bond rights
but also waived its contractual right to payment).
84. 310 Ga. 152, 849 S.E.2d 186 (2020).
85. Id. at 153, 849 S.E.2d at 188.
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contractor performed some of the work and then had a parting of ways
with the owner that resulted in a mechanic’s lien. The lien included
amounts for unpaid work performed and anticipated profit on the
contracted work not performed. The trial court granted summary
judgment in favor of the owner, determining that anticipated profit was
non-lienable and therefore that the entire lien was void. The court of
appeals affirmed the determination that anticipated profit is nonlienable; however, it reversed the determination that the lien was
entirely void because it included non-lienable amounts.86
The supreme court ultimately affirmed the court of appeals’ decision.87
The supreme court looked to Georgia’s mechanics lien statute and
determined that a “lien is limited to amounts actually due to the claimant
based on the work completed at the time the lien is filed, not amounts
that the claimant was expecting to receive for future work under the
contract.”88 The supreme court determined that the court of appeals
correctly applied prior case law by voiding the overstated portion of a
mechanic’s lien but not the lien in its entirety.89
In Cook Sales, Inc. v. Concrete Enterprises, LLC,90 the Georgia Court
of Appeals decided an issue relating to a 2009 change in the lien law.
Before 2009, O.C.G.A. § 44-14-361.1(a) required a lienor to file a notice of
commencement of the lien action within fourteen days of filing such an
action.91 In 2009, that code section was revised to require filing the notice
of commencement to within thirty days after “commencement of a lien
action.”92
In Cook Sales, a lienor-subcontractor timely filed suit against the
general contractor, but process was not served on the defendant-general
contractor for more than three months.93 The subcontractor filed its
notice of commencement of the action against the general contractor four
days after obtaining service. After obtaining a default judgment against
the general contractor, the subcontractor filed a foreclosure suit against
the property owner, who moved for summary judgment based on the
subcontractor’s failure to file its notice of commencement of action within

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id. at 154, 849 S.E.2d at 188.
Id.
Id. at 154-55, 849 S.E.2d at 189.
Id. at 155, 849 S.E.2d at 189.
356 Ga. App. 899, 849 S.E.2d 734 (2020).
Id. at 901-02, 849 S.E.2d at 736.
Id. at 902, 849 S.E.2d at 736.
Id. at 902, 849 S.E.2d at 736–37.
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thirty days after filing that lawsuit. The trial court denied the motion to
dismiss but granted a certificate of immediate review.94
The court of appeals ultimately reversed the trial court, explaining
that the change in statutory language in 2009 from “filing” to
“commencement” did not change the underlying requirement that lien
claimants file the notice of commencement of action within the prescribed
time of the filing of the action.95
The Georgia Court of Appeals in Optum Construction Group, LLC v.
City Electric Supply Company,96 addressed another mechanic lien issue.
In that case, the general contractor subcontracted with “Palmetto Power
Services Palmetto Power Unlimited, [I]nc.” (Palmetto Unlimited).
However, Palmetto Power Services, LLC (Palmetto Services) contracted
with a material supplier for the project and then failed to fully pay for
the materials. The supplier filed a lien, which the general contractor
bonded off the property.97
After reducing its claims against Palmetto Services to judgment, the
supplier sued the general contractor and its surety to collect on the lien
discharge bond.98 Those defendants sought summary judgment
invalidating the lien on the grounds that Palmetto Services was outside
the chain of contracts with the owner. The Gwinnett County State Court
denied the general contractor’s motion and granted judgment to
suppliers. The general contractor appealed, and the court of appeals
affirmed in part and reversed in part.99
The court of appeals determined there was a disputed issue of fact
whether the general contractor had a contractual relationship through a
chain of contracts with Palmetto Services.100 The court noted that the
entity identified in the subcontract, Palmetto Unlimited, never existed
under the name listed in the subcontract, and thus the record was “not
clear as to identity of the subcontractor.”101 Consequently, the court
reversed the grant of summary judgment against the general contractor
and its surety, while affirming the denial of the general contractor’s
motion for summary judgment.102

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id. at 899, 849 S.E.2d at 735.
Id. at 903, 849 S.E.2d at 737.
356 Ga. App. 797, 849 S.E.2d 238 (2020).
Id. at 797–98, 849 S.E.2d at 238–39.
Id. at 798, 849 S.E.2d at 239.
Id.at 797–98, 849 S.E.2d at 239.
Id. at 800, 849 S.E.2d at 240.
Id.
Id. at 800-01, 849 S.E.2d at 241.
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VI. INSURANCE COVERAGE
The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia in Phoenix
Ins. Co. v. Robinson Constr. Co.,103 determined it had subject-matter
jurisdiction over an insurer’s requests for declaratory judgment
concerning the insurer’s duty to defend, but not its duty to indemnify. In
Phoenix Ins. Co., the insured subcontractor was sued for various breaches
including defective work.104 The subcontractor made demand on its
commercial general liability insurance policies (CGL policies) and its
commercial excess liability policies (umbrella policies) to defend and
indemnify the subcontractor in a lawsuit filed by the general
contractor.105 The insurers filed a declaratory judgment action seeking to
avoid providing any coverage under the policies.106
In its decision, the court separated the duty to defend coverage from
the liability coverage issues.107 The court first determined that the
duty-to-defend issue was ripe for determination because the insured
subcontractor had made demand upon the insurers to defend it, and the
insurers had denied that demand.108 However, the court further
determined that it did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over this
claim for declaratory relief because the subcontractor’s liability to the
general contractor had not yet been determined.109 Until the
subcontractor’s liability was established, and on what grounds, the issue
of the insurers’ duty to indemnify the subcontractor was not yet ripe.110
In another declaratory judgment action involving insurance coverage,
the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia addressed an
insurer’s argument for exclusion based on the “All Construction”
provision of the policy.111 In Kinsale Ins. Co. v. JazAtlanta 438, LLC, the
insured, JazAtlanta 438, LLC, obtained a commercial general liability
policy from Kinsale Insurance Company.112 The policy contained a

103. No. 20CV414LMM, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 182389, at *1 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 21, 2020).
104. Id. at *2.
105. Id. at *2-3.
106. Id. at *1-2.
107. Id. at *6.
108. Id. at *7-8.
109. Id. at *11-12.
110. Id. at *12.
111. Kinsale Ins. Co. v. JazAtlanta 438, LLC, No. 19CV02044SDG, 2020 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 159063, at *1 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 1, 2020).
112. Id. at *1.
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provision entitled “Exclusion—All Construction” that excluded coverage,
broadly, for claims arising out of construction and related activities.113
Defendant McConnell suffered injuries after completing carpentry
work on the insured’s property.114 Upon completing work for the day, he
attempted to leave the property, but a gate blocked his exit. He attempted
to open the gate, but it fell and crushed McConnell’s foot and ankle. As a
result, he sued the insured. The insurer asked the Northern District of
Georgia to declare that it had no duty to defend or indemnify the insured
concerning McConnell’s lawsuit. The insurer and insured filed cross
motions for summary judgment.115
Applying standard rules of contract construction, the court looked
specifically to the policy’s “All Construction” exclusion. 116 The
undisputed facts showed that McConnell was performing construction
activities on the property.117 “[B]ut for his carpentry work, [he] would not
have been on the [p]roperty, would not have attempted to lift the gate,
and his alleged injuries would not have occurred.”118 Accordingly, the
court denied the insured’s motion for summary judgment and granted
the insurer’s motion for summary judgment.119
VII. HOMEOWNER’S ASSOCIATIONS
In Howell v. Lochwolde Homeowners Association, Inc.,120 the Georgia
Court of Appeals decided a restrictive-deed case. A homeowner was
constructing accessory structures on his property, including a “freestanding, 26-foot high, fully insulated ‘tree-house’ with a shingled roof
and a separate lookout tower and zip line platform.”121 The homeowners’
association (HOA) denied the homeowner’s construction plans and fined
the homeowner for violating covenants in the property deed when he
continued with construction.122

113. Id. at *1-2 “This insurance does not apply to any claim or ‘suit’ for ‘bodily injury’ . . .
arising directly or indirectly out of, related to, or, in any way involving any construction,
development, reconstruction, rebuilding, restoration, renovation, remodeling, repair,
upgrading, improvement, or refurbishing of any building or structure of any description.”
114. Id. at *2-3.
115. Id.
116. Id. at *7-8 (citing Boardman Petroleum, Inc. v. Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 269 Ga.
326, 327, 498 S.E.2d 492, 494 (1998)).
117. Id. at *8.
118. Id. at *11.
119. Id. at *14.
120. 355 Ga. App 678, 845 S.E.2d 410 (2020).
121. Id. at 679, 845 S.E.2d at 412.
122. Id. at 679, 845 S.E.2d at 412-13.
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Howell ultimately wound up before the court of appeals after the trial
court upheld the HOA’s authority to require removal of the structures,
but denied its authority to fine the homeowner.123 The court of appeals
reversed and remanded based on a peculiar fact—the HOA had been
administratively dissolved for over fifteen years for failing to pay
required renewal fees.124 While the finer points of the court of appeals’
decision are less about construction than association law, the case is
instructive to investigate corporate formalities if a property developer is
challenged by an HOA or other property association.
VIII. LOST PROFITS DAMAGES
In Mitchell & Associates, Inc. v. Global Systems Integration, Inc.,125 the
Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the grant of summary judgment
awarding lost profits despite contract language waiving consequential
damages. The lost profits were those the contractor would have earned
under its prime contract had the subcontractor properly performed its
sub-contractual obligations.126
The court of appeals began its analysis with the premise that “‘[a]
party who has been injured by a breach of contract can recover profits
that would have resulted from performance’ of that contract.”127 The
court then determined that the lost profits were direct, not consequential,
damages because those lost profits “[could] be traced solely to [the
subcontractor’s] breach of the Agreement and were the immediate fruit
of that contract.”128 Finally, the court of appeals affirmed the Cherokee
County Superior Court’s award of these lost-profit damages because
theses damages were not barred by the contractual waiver of
consequential damages.129
IX. SAFETY-STATUTORY EMPLOYEE
In Brack v. CPPI of Georgia, Inc.,130 the Georgia Court of Appeals
addressed an all-too-common fact pattern for a construction site—injury
of a subcontractor’s employee.131 The subcontractor’s employee sued the
123. Id. at 679-80, 845 S.E.2d at 413.
124. Id. at 678, 682, 845 S.E.2d at 412, 414.
125. 356 Ga. App. 200, 844 S.E.2d 551 (2020).
126. Id. at 203, 844 S.E.2d at 554.
127. Id. (quoting Comtrol, Inc. v. H-K Corp., 134 Ga. App. 349, 352, 214 S.E.2d 588, 591
(1975)).
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. 357 Ga. App. 744, 849 S.E.2d 521 (2020).
131. Id. at 745, 849 S.E.2d at 522.
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general contractor, seeking to recover outside of the statutory workman’s
compensation system.132 The trial court granted summary judgment
determining that the sale-of-goods exception to the workman’s
compensation system did not apply.133
The Brack decision may seem somewhat routine, but it foreshadows
an issue likely to become more important in the future. The use of
modular building systems continues to increase, with the modules often
produced in a factory, shipped to the project site, and assembled by a
small crew of trained technicians. This type of modular construction is
more likely to be a sale-of-goods transaction than that in Brack because
the value of the manufactured components substantially outweighs that
of the installation services. The sale-of-goods aspect of modular
construction has many implications beyond workman’s compensation.
In Richey v. Kroger Company, 134 the Georgia Court of Appeals
addressed a very different workplace safety case. In Richey, Kroger hired
a contractor to perform work on its property.135 One of the contractor’s
employees observed a person entering a worker’s car while parked in
Kroger’s parking lot. The worker ran to his vehicle and knocked on the
window, only to be shot and killed by the intruder. The worker’s widow
sued Kroger for failing to maintain a safe and secure parking lot, despite
a “long history” of crimes committed in the parking lot and nearby.136
The trial court granted summary judgment to Kroger, finding that the
worker acted unreasonably by leaving the safety of the worksite and
placing himself in danger by engaging the individual who had broken
into the truck.137 The court of appeals reversed the grant of summary
judgment, determining the record did not show that no reasonable person
would have acted as did the worker, and thus the reasonableness of the
worker’s conduct was a question for the jury.138
X. AMENDMENT TO STATUTE OF REPOSE
In response to the 2019 opinion of Southern States Chemical, Inc. v.
Tampa Tank & Welding, Inc.,139 the Georgia General Assembly enacted
S.B. 451140, which excludes breach-of-contract claims from Georgia’s
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id. at 849 S.E.2d at 522-23.
Id. at 747, 849 S.E.2d at 523.
355 Ga. App. 551, 845 S.E.2d 351 (2020).
Id., 845 S.E.2d at 352.
Id. at 552, 845 S.E.2d at 353.
Id.
Id. at 555, 845 S.E.2d at 355.
353 Ga. App. 286, 836 S.E.2d 617 (2019).
Ga. S.B. 451, Reg. Sess. (2020).
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eight-year statute of repose for construction-related claims.141 In
Southern States Chemical, the Georgia Court of Appeals held that the
statute of repose applied to claims for breach of an express warranty that
extended beyond the eight-year period.142 To avoid the loss of such longterm warranties, the legislature added O.C.G.A. § 9-3-51(c), which
excludes from the statute of repose “actions for breach of contract,
including, but not limited to, actions for breach of express contractual
warranties.”143

141. O.C.G.A. § 9-3-51 (2021).
142. 353 Ga. App. at 295, 836 S.E.2d at 625.
143. O.C.G.A. § 9-3-51(c) (2021).

